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According to many criteria, agency, intentionality, responsibility and freedom of decision,
require conscious decisions. Freud already assumed that many of our decisions are
influenced by dynamically unconscious motives or that we even perform unconscious
actions based on completely unconscious considerations. Such actions might not
be intentional, and perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, we would not be
responsible for them and freedom of decision would be missing. Recent psychological
and neurophysiological research has added to this a number of phenomena (the “new
unconscious”) in which behavior is completely unconscious or in which the decision
or its execution is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behavior,
habitualized behavior, actions based on plain unconscious deliberations, intrusion of
information from the dorsal pathway, etc. However, since this makes up the largest
part of the behavior which is generally regarded as action, intentionality, yet agency,
responsibility and even compatibilist freedom of decision for the largest part of our
behavior may be threatened. Such considerations have led to a lively debate, which,
however, suffers from generalizations that lump all these unconscious phenomena
together. In contrast, the aim of this article is to discuss individual unconscious influences
on our behavior separately with respect to what extent they require changes in traditional
conceptualizations. The first part (sections 2–4) of the article outlines the “traditions” and
their elaborations: the intentional causalist concept of action, an associated empirical
theory of action and standard concepts of responsibility and compatibilist freedom
of decision, as well as the challenges for them. In the second part (sections 5–9),
the aforementioned unconscious influences on our actions (except for automated
and habitualized actions, which I discuss elsewhere) are examined: 1. unconscious
priming, 2. dynamically unconscious motives, 3. dorsal pathway information influencing
conscious decisions, 4. unconsciously altered execution of conscious intentions, and
5. unconscious deliberations and decisions. To what extent do these phenomena
C1. require a change in the concept of action, C2. curtail intentionality or agency,
C3. responsibility, and C4. freedom? The result is: The curtailments prove to be
far less dramatic than they initially appear; they require more watchfulness but no
conceptual change.
Keywords: unconscious motive, unconscious action, responsibility, freedom, agency, intentional causalism, new
unconscious, priming
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1. TOPIC AND STRUCTURE OF THE
ARTICLE
This article deals with a challenge to the traditional conceptions
of action and intentionality as well as of responsibility and
freedom represented by findings in psychology about the
pervasive influence of unconscious factors on our actions.
Already Freud (1901–1924/1941, 1923/1940) assumed that a
large part of our decisions is influenced by unconscious
motives or that we perform unconscious actions based on
completely unconscious thoughts which are hidden from our
consciousness and conscious control because of their rejected
content. Such actions are possibly not intentional, perhaps
not even actions in the strict sense, and we might not
be responsible for them. The Freudian unconscious is the
dynamic, i.e., motivated unconscious. Recent psychological
research, however, has revealed a number of further and
pervasive phenomena, the new unconscious (Hassin et al.,
2005), where behavior is executed completely unconsciously
for mere “technical” reasons of effectiveness and efficiency
or where the decision is influenced by unconscious factors
as a by-product; hence it is a non-dynamic unconscious
without any critical motives. Phenomena of this sort include:
priming, actions based on unconscious deliberations, implicit
motives, etc. Some examples are: after having been unconsciously
primed on stereotypes of elderly people, subjects walk slower;
subjects unconsciously primed for achievement make more
efforts to perform a task well; subjects throwing darts at
pictures of persons they like have worse scores as subjects
aiming at pictures of neutral faces; unconsciously seizing
the opportunity and opening the window; or after being
unconsciously primed on ‘impression formation’ subjects,
instead of simply reading a list of words referring to personal
features, make up their mind about what a person with
these qualities would be like. Automatic actions – such as
changing gears when driving a car, unconsciously imitating
the conversation partner, unconsciously executing a (simple)
intention when the right moment has come – are another part
of the new unconscious.
The existence and knowledge of these phenomena could
imply several theoretical and practical problems or challenges.
C1. Decision-theoretical model of action: Actions could function
completely differently than usually assumed. In particular,
there may be no central controlling instance that weighs
up the reasons for action, takes a decision according to
the strongest reasons, which in turn causes the action. C2.
Agency: Possibly, the traditional intentional-causalist concept
of action – according to which actions are caused by
intentions – is no longer applicable, since there are no (or
hardly any) actions at all (in this sense). C3. Responsibility:
The domain of what we, as conscious subjects, really control
may shrink to a tiny size, and thereby the sphere for
which we are responsible may diminish accordingly. C4.
Freedom: If actions are not consciously chosen on the basis
of our reasons for action, or if their selection no longer
depends on what we consider important, then it could
be that we do not even have a compatibilist freedom of
decision (in the sense of a rational, authentic or autonomous
decision), and perhaps not even freedom of action in the
conditional sense.1 So the mentioned discoveries are not
only challenges for the traditional conception of action but
also for our legal and everyday handling of responsibility
and freedom.
The aim of this article is to discuss these challenges
posed by the psychological findings about unconscious
motives and actions. The mentioned phenomena are not
only very different, they also have different implications
regarding agency, responsibility and freedom; therefore,
they must be examined individually. More specifically,
1. the interference of various unconscious mechanisms
(e.g., priming and dynamically unconscious motives) in
conscious decisions, 2. alterations in the execution of
actions by unconscious mechanisms, and 3. several types
of unconscious deliberations and decisions are examined,
if and to what extent they influence or should influence
C1: the decision-theoretical model of action, C2: agency
and intentionality of the behavior, C3: responsibility for it
and C4: freedom of decision. Automatic and habitualized
behaviors, i.e., learned, schematic and automatically triggered
and executed behaviors, are also unconscious but make up a
big separate and particular group. I will not deal with them
here; I have discussed them in a parallel article again with
regard to the challenges C1 to C3: Lumer (2017). Implicit
bias (see e.g., Brownstein and Saul, 2016) is also not discussed
here because of its peculiar problems. – Executionary details
of our actions are usually not intended, but are controlled
mostly automatically (to a large extent even by different
brain areas than our decisional structures), and therefore,
also unconsciously. These phenomena are not discussed
here either, because they are not problematic for and do
not conflict with the traditional conceptions of action and
responsibility inasmuch as they do not threaten action-control
by our ego.
In the next three sections (sections 2–4) I will explain the
challenged philosophical background, i.e., a decision theoretical
model of action, the intentional-causalist model of action and
intentionality, traditional criteria of retrospective responsibility
and criteria of freedom of decision, in somewhat more detail
and how it may be challenged by the psychological findings.
Then, in the second part of the article (sections 5–9), I
will give an overview of the three mentioned groups of
unconscious phenomena in action (1. unconscious influences
on conscious decisions, 2. unconscious alterations in the
action execution, and 3. unconscious decisions), systemize and
explain them, and assess whether and how they contribute to
the four challenges. Because the phenomena themselves are
sometimes disputed, and above all since only few and not
always convincing explanations for them are available, I have
made some effort to provide my own explanations of the
examined phenomena.
1Freedom of action: Subject s is free to do a/s can do a, iff holds: If s decides to do
a, then s does a (cf. Moore, 1912, ch. 6).
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2. THE CHALLENGE OF UNCONSCIOUS
MOTIVES AND ACTIONS FOR THE
TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF
ACTIONS AND FOR FREEDOM
The most widely accepted, classical conception of action is
intentional causalism: An action is a behavior caused [in a non-
deviant way (Lumer, 2008)] by a respective intention, which
represents this behavior beforehand. In order to be an action
also in a narrow, emphatic sense, the intention, additionally,
has to be “really ours,” namely volitive, i.e., a (in principle)
rationalizable integration of our conscious attitudes towards the
action (Lumer, 2013). The philosophical reason for intentional
causalism, apart from its (arguable) empirical reality, is that it
explains the value of actions, namely that actions conceived in
this way give practical power to our conscious ego:2 make it
control our behavior and thereby change pieces of the world
for realizing our desires and implementing the decisions of our
reason (ibid.). The intentional-causalist conception has not only
been dominant in the history of philosophy – from Aristotle via
Hume, Kant to, e.g., Davidson – it is also prevalent in everyday
thinking of actions, and it is the basis of criminal, civil as well as
moral responsibility and hence also of the criminal justice system.
Intentional causalism is not the only theory of action proposed
in philosophy. But here I can neither discuss the competing
conceptions nor justify intentional causalism (but see: Lumer,
2005, 235–250; Lumer, 2010, 967; 969–970; Lumer, 2013, 511–
517). However, for the main task of this article it is sufficient
that intentional causalism is the most important conception of
action in philosophy as well as in everyday thinking and it is
the basis for common Western conceptions of moral and legal
responsibility. If all this were called into question by the above-
mentioned empirical findings, then this would already generate
sufficiently important problems to justify investigating whether
this questioning really exists. The same applies to the following
sketches of the concepts of freedom and responsibility.
In order to be able to respond to the mentioned psychological
challenges, beyond the bare minimum of intentional causalism
some general features of a fitting model of decision making are
needed. Here I will make recourse to my optimality belief theory
of intention and decision making (Lumer, 2005), which says that
intentions consist in optimality beliefs that a certain option is the
best among the considered alternatives; furthermore, it assumes
a process of decision making, leading to such optimality beliefs,
with some affinities to the processes presupposed in rational
decision theory but allowing much more flexibility: for example,
the optimality theory assumes that there is a vast spectrum
of possibilities of how extended the underlying deliberation is,
from immediately believing that a certain option is optimum,
over considering only one option other than doing nothing
with only one relevant advantage – this is similar to Aristotle’s
practical syllogisms –, to, at the other extrem, constructing
2Here “ego” does not mean some “homunculus” or a department in the brain, but
rather the cohesive mental structure (consisting of unrefused mental events, states,
dispositions, and underlying structures) that controls action as an inner subject
through the formation of intentions (Lumer, 2014d, section 6).
complex options, compiling relevant consequences, assessing
their probability and desirability, etc. Optimality judgments can
also remain implicit: the subject searches for information that
enables him to make an optimality judgment about one of the
alternatives and keeps track of which important information is
still missing. When he has collected all the necessary information,
then he believes in the judgment of optimality without having
to consciously represent it. – With the help of this theory one
can also explain more precisely what intentionality is according
to the “simple view” (intentionality presupposes a corresponding
intention) (Adams, 1986): An action is intentional under a
certain description, iff this description was used in the intention
and the action was not caused in a deviant way (on deviance:
Lumer, 2008). An action consequence is intentional under a
certain description iff (I1) the agent has considered it under
this description in his compilation of consequences, (I2) this
consequence had the prominent role of an aim or means in
his planning, and (I3) the action produced this sequence in
a non-deviant way. An action consequence is brought about
only knowingly iff conditions I1 and I3 are fulfilled, but not
I2. – There is no need to take exactly this optimality belief
theory to be able to reply to the psychological challenges.
However, in philosophy of action there is hardly any further
elaborated empirical deliberation model, and the sketched model
will be sufficient.
The unconscious influences on our decisions and actions
mentioned above may also impair or even nullify our freedom
of decision. For one thing, freedom of decision can be conceived
compatibilistically, so that the determinacy of our decisions does
not exclude their freedom. The three most important conceptions
of compatibilistic freedom of decision are: 1. According to
(subjectivist) rationalism, the aim of a free decision is to find
the best option and initiate its implementation. The best option
is the one that fulfills the maximum of our desires. To this
end, good options for action must be constructed, the relevant
consequences of these options must be found and evaluated
according to our desires (e.g., Dennett, 1984; Smith, 1997;
Lumer, 2002). Philosophical (in contrast to economic) theories
of subjective rationality also require that desires be critically
filtered in one way or another (e.g., Brandt, 1979, 10–16; 70–89;
110–129; Lumer, 2000/2009, 241–427; 521–548; Lumer, 1998).
2. According to theories of autonomy, decisions are free if they
choose actions according to whether they arise from the essence
or core of the person (e.g., Frankfurt, 1971, 1999; Ekstrom,
2005). This presupposes that in deliberation relationships are
established between the subject’s firmly anchored desires and
values and the action. 3. Objectivist theories of good reason
require that a free decision be sensitive to objective reasons,
i.e., recognizes reasons for and against the various options
and chooses the action according to these reasons (e.g., Nagel,
1986; Wolf, 1990). The nature of such objective reasons, our
subjective access to them and their existence are controversial.
However, if there are such reasons, their consideration in the
decision definitely requires some cognitive complexity – as
Kant’s illustrations of free decisions according to the Categorical
Imperative show (Kant, 1785/1903, BA 18–19; 53–57; 66–
69 = A.A. 403; 421–424; 429–430) – which probably is only
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achieved by slow, conscious cognitive processes. – For another
thing, freedom of decision can be conceived incompatibilistically.
Incompatibilists generally see indeterminacy as a necessary but
not sufficient condition for freedom of decision. Even if most
incompatibilists do not specify sufficient conditions, the most
plausible proposals for this, again, go in the direction of the
just-outlined compatibilist theories. So we can limit the further
discussion to these three theories.
Before presenting and discussing the conditions for
retrospective responsibility, it is convenient to first explain
the challenges for the three theories and their applications
by the unconscious influences outlined above in more detail.
We must distinguish between two fundamentally different
challenges: (i) theoretical challenges, i.e., possible refutations
of the empirical components of the theories presented, and (ii)
practical, normative challenges, i.e., more or less profound and
widespread limitations of the action character of our behavior,
its intentionality, our freedom of decision and (to be discussed
below) responsibility.
(i) C1: Optimality belief theory and C2: intentional causalism:
The discovered unconscious influences on our actions and
decisions could be evidences that the whole idea of intentional
causalism and the empirical theory elaborating and extending it,
i.e., the optimality belief theory, are completely false (or at least
empirically nearly empty). Actions could function completely
differently in that the “decision” is taken on an unconscious
level, and our conscious deliberations and intentions, e.g., only
inform us about what has been decided “there”; this might
be called the “display thesis” about our consciousness. [Libet
(1985; more references and critique: Lumer, 2014a) and Wegner
(2002; critique: Lumer, 2014b) suggest this, Koch and Crick
(2001) defend it, and philosophers like (Andy) Clark et al.
(2013, 1–30) radicalize it.] Apart from the empirical confutation,
in such a case the traditional conception of action would
be empirically void; there would not be any control of our
behavior by our conscious ego and our conscious desires; neither
would there be freedom of decision, freedom of action or
any responsibility via our conscious assessment and respective
control of possible actions. Here I will not discuss the display
thesis in general (but see: Lumer, 2014c, 7; 10–12) since it
is much too far-fetched. What should interest us here instead
is whether the empirical phenomena discussed below perhaps
confirm the display theory or falsify the optimality judgment
theory. – C1: Optimality belief theory: The optimality belief theory
holds, among others, that at least in complex deliberation the
final optimality judgment is reached by integrating the various
aspects of the options. Precisely because of this complexity,
the integration must be conscious – the unconscious cannot
take so many aspects into account correctly –; and in order to
be taken into account at all in the conscious integration, the
aspects must be conscious. That unconscious factors influence
a conscious deliberation, as it was observed with various of the
mentioned phenomena, should then actually not occur at all;
it would be prima facie a refutation of the optimality belief
theory or at least require considerable explanations. Moreover,
this should lead to incorrect integration of the various aspects
of the decision – although the decision and action usually
look quite rational. – C2: Intentional causalism: Some of the
phenomena in question regard unconscious influences on our
execution of actions. These unconscious influences intervene
between the intention formation and the execution of the action,
thereby leading to a distortion of the action and possibly to
a misalignment of intention and action. Pervasive and strong
unconscious influences of this type could question intentional
causalism as an empirical theory since one cornerstone of this
theory, i.e., the regular correspondence of intention and behavior,
would no longer hold. – C3: Freedom: Since the theories of
freedom outlined above are not empirical but normative, they
cannot be confuted by the empirical findings to be discussed here.
However, the confutation of the sketched empirical theory would
imply normative challenges (to be discussed below).
(ii) C2: Intentional causalism and agency, C3: freedom, C4:
responsibility: Some of the empirical findings suggest that the
intention itself – or a quasi-intention, if we do not want to
call it “intention” – can be unconscious along with the process
leading to it (i.e., perhaps an unconscious deliberation) as well
as the action itself. We might even be aware of the resulting
behavior but would not recognize it as our action – as for
example in the case of what psychoanalysis conceives as a
Freudian slip. In such a case all the conditions of an action,
as they are established by intentional causalism, might even be
fulfilled, the mental conditions, however, only by unconscious
mental states. Whether the resulting behavior would still be an
action is debatable; in any case it would not be an action in
the emphatic sense since it would not be controlled by our
conscious ego. And without this control the decision and action
would not be free and we could not be responsible for the
action. Similar considerations hold if single motives or whole
parts of the deliberation remain unconscious: As far as these
parts influence the action and thereby the action’s consequences,
these actions and action consequences are not intentional in the
narrow sense. They are alienated from us because we do not
recognize them as originating from our person; therefore, our
decisions in these respects would not be free either. – C2: Agency,
intentionality, C3: freedom, C4: responsibility: If unconscious
factors intervene between our intention and its execution and
thus lead to a misfit of the action to the intention the executed
behavior would not be under our control; hence we would not be
responsible for it – at least not directly –; still less would we have
acted freely.
3. THE NECESSITY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS FOR EMPHATIC
AGENCY, INTENTIONALITY AND
FREEDOM
Why and to what extent exactly do the emphatic character
of action, intentionality in the narrower sense, freedom and
responsibility require consciousness? Are the presented (and still
to be presented) normative conceptions not too narrow? What
are the relative advantages of consciousness? The value of good
decisions is that they identify and implement the really best
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action. As they are theorized in rational decision theory, the steps
to achieve this are:
D1: Compile options: The relevant, i.e., possibly optimal,
options must be identified or, in the case of complex and
in any respect novel situations or goals, must first be newly
constructed. In order to be possibly optimum, the options
must fit to the action situation.
D2: Identify consequences: All possible relevant
consequences of these options must be identified.
D3: Determine probabilities: The probability of these
possible consequences must be determined.
D4: Evaluate consequences: The desirability of these
consequences must be determined ultimately on the basis of
the fundamental evaluation criteria of the agent and taking
into account critical filters.
D5: Integrate information: The information acquired in
the previous steps must be integrated into an optimality
judgment based on criteria such as expected desirability or
prospect desirability.
These steps do not have to take place in exactly this order.
And in fact, for mere economic reasons, they are only carried
out in such detail and completely in exceptional cases; practical
rationality requires very specific shortcuts (Lumer, 1990, 390–
400; Lumer, 2005, 241–247; 248–250). However, to prevent these
shortcuts from possibly leading to dramatically wrong decisions,
certain safeguarding conditions must be fulfilled. Above all, there
are two characteristics of unconscious information processing,
because of which the unconscious mind can perform each
of these steps correctly in simple cases only: (i) a high
degree of modularity, i.e., the restriction to specific tasks
on the basis of specific information without including any
other possibly relevant information, and (ii) associativity, i.e.,
information processing according to semantic links without
taking syntax or formal criteria into account (Levy, 2014a, 40–
47). Conversely, conscious information processing does not have
these limitations: (i) According to the global workspace theory
(Baars, 1988, 1997; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al.,
2011), consciousness of information serves precisely to make this
information universally available to large parts of the brain, so
that these parts, when the information is relevant to them, can
react to it in a specific way. By making a thought conscious,
in particular thoughts on a decision situation, a certain option
or a possible consequence, the thought is so to speak globally
published in the brain [Levy calls this “broadcasting” (Levy,
2014b, 62–69)] and thereby exposed to all sorts of comments
and criticisms from all relevant parts of the brain (Lumer,
2014a, 86–87; 96–100). (ii) By means of conscious information
processing, we are able to process non-automated algorithms
neatly, in particular to check compliance with complex criteria
or to proceed constructively step by step, for example in
arithmetical operations.
(i) Of the above-mentioned deliberation steps, compiling
options (D1) and identifying consequences (D2) now contain
very strong generalizations: all relevant options and all relevant
consequences must be determined; or more precisely, rationally
considering our epistemic restrictions, all relevant options and
consequences that are somehow accessible to us with the
current knowledge must be determined. The options can in
turn be composed from smaller steps, and consequences can
also be determined by chaining consequences of consequences.
All this requires the use of very diverse information scattered
over many modules, which can only be retrieved from the
global workspace. This is the role of consciousness as a global
workspace in the active search for options and consequences.
– Unconscious routines usually stop and reawaken attention
when unusual situations occur. Only the conscious search for
and construction of flexible alternatives with the help of the
global workspace can then initiate the adequate coping with the
situation. The same applies to the discovery and exploitation
of special opportunities for action. – Let us now return to
the shortcuts. With the very largest shortcuts, we believe or
presume to have immediately found the plausibly best option
or at least a good approximation of it; further considerations
would probably only make this option more expensive. Even
in this case of the simplest decision, consciousness still has the
function of broadcasting the (imminent or just made) decision to
all relevant parts of the brain, thus exposing it to comprehensive
criticism and thereby possibly receiving feedback that there are
relevant and perhaps significantly better options or, that there
are further possibly relevant consequences, in particular negative
side effects, which make it advisable to suspend the decision for
the time being.3
(ii) However, if they are to be correct, the other deliberation
steps – determining probabilities (D3), evaluating consequences
(D4), integrating information (D5), but in part also the
first two (e.g., when the feasibility of an option has to be
checked or conditional or remote consequences have to be
determined inferentially) – require the processing of algorithms
or the checking of compliance with criteria. Only by conscious
processing can this be achieved with sufficient accuracy4.
3Levy in his outstanding theory (Levy, 2014a,b) also justifies the necessity of
consciousness for responsibility with the global workspace. However, he sets
another focus, which I would call “autonomy.” I will return to this issue below
(in footnotes 5 and 6).
4Dijksterhuis and co-authors (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) have
tried to prove the opposite thesis, viz. that, exactly on the contrary, an unconscious
integration of the different information leads to better results than the conscious
one. However, first, what Dijksterhuis and his co-authors call an “unconcious
thought” is a deliberation based on consciously received information about
the available options and their features; hence, in their experiments only a
small part of the deliberation, viz. the integration of that information to a
decision, is unconscious. So, in these experiments the importance of consciousness
in acquiring that information is not put into question. Second, Dijksterhuis’
experimental situation is designed exactly to queer a good conscious integration
of the many pieces of (conscious) information: Subjects are bombarded with a
huge mass of data in a very short time, e.g. 48 features in random order for
four seconds each. During the following three minutes, dedicated to conscious
reflection, it is impossible to recall all these features and then to consciously
count advantages and disadvantages of the options or to compare all options with
respect to the single dimensions in descending order of importance (cf. Payne
et al., 1993). With a well ordered written list of the features and sufficient time,
conscious decision would obviously be much more precise than the unconscious
deliberation. Third, in most of the examples the advantages and disadvantages had
only to be counted but not weighted. Since unconscious quantitative impression
formation on consecutively experienced items works quite well, the examined
way of (additive) information integration was quite favorable for unconscious
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What does all this mean on the normative level? Emphatic
agency and freedom in the sense of autonomy are lacking with
unconsciousness, above all because the decision cannot take all
of the subject’s essential concerns into account (D2) and also the
filter function is switched off in the evaluation (D4); hence the
decision cannot represent the subject as a whole.5 Unconsciously
aspired goals are not pursued intentionally in the narrow
sense, because while unconsciously believing to bring about the
respective action consequence, the subject does not know in a
somewhat more comprehensive sense what to bring about this
consequence means, i.e., what it implies, which total desirability
it has, etc. Freedom of decision in the sense of rationality is
lacking in unconscious decisions and decisions with unconscious
components, because the criteria for rational decisions are only
met by coincidence; most detailed deliberations with all steps
D1 to D5 cannot be made unconsciously anyway. And even
for fulfilling the standards of the simplest but sometimes still
rational decision, the unconscious decisions lack the precaution
that the option in question is exposed to spontaneous criticism
in the global workspace regarding better options and relevant
side effects.
4. THE CHALLENGE OF UNCONSCIOUS
MOTIVES AND ACTIONS FOR
RESPONSIBILITY
The following list of conditions for retrospective moral and (in
Western societies) also approximately criminal responsibility –
which aim at efficient social control of human actions via, among
others, punishments and rewards (Lumer, 2012) – is an attempt
at an ethical systematization of all conditions widely accepted
though not brought together in the literature and which are
roughly present also in most everyday thinking on retrospective
responsibility. Hence, the list does not take up the particular
conditions of unorthodox or minority positions like versions
of incompatibilism about responsibility, the doctrine of double
effect, guidance control, ascriptivism or attributionism.
A subject s is (retrospectively) responsible for his action a (that
s does A at time t) <for the event e produced by a> iff:
R1: Objective deed component: That s does A at t is an action.
<And this action has produced e.>.
R2: Attenuated principle of alternate possibilities: s could
have acted otherwise (namely, if a is immoral or forbidden s
could have performed a morally better/permitted action b),
if s had not been prevented from doing so by over-
determination. In the context of possible unconscious
processing (and much less for conscious processing of mostly no longer present
information). This will probably be quite different with decisions in which the
various features have diverse importance for the subject and the subject has time to
systematize the obtained information. – Further critique: Levy, 2008; Levy, 2014b,
58–62.
5Reflections of this kind play the leading role in Levy’s theory and are further
developed by him (Levy, 2014a,b). However, Levy does not regard this kind of
integration of all important concerns of the subject into the decision to act only
as a condition of autonomy and freedom of decision, but already as a condition for
responsibility.
influences, “s can do B” means: If s intends to do B,
and (in case of risk of unconscious mental distortions)
uses standard procedures known in his society to exclude
psychic distortions, then s does B.
R3: Subjective deed component/mens rea: s does A<has
produced the consequence e by his doing A> 1.
premeditated, 2. goal-intentionally, 3. means-intentionally,
4. knowingly, or 5. culpably unknowingly (cf. Kenny, 1978,
1–2; 5–7). These subconditions become weaker and weaker
from R3.1 to R3.5. Which of these five subconditions to
apply depends on the type of action or consequence: The
more serious the consequence, the weaker the subjective
part of the act can be in order to imply responsibility.
Hence, in the case of socially very harmful actions, culpable
ignorance alone is sufficient for responsibility.
R4: Sanity, soundness of mind: 1. The intention to a must
originate from considerations of s, e.g., the intention may
not be caused by hypnosis; 2. at the decision time the ability
of s to deliberate must not be below a level critical for
the inclusion of morally and legally relevant information;
specifically s recognizes alternatives to a, and recognizes
the possible consequences of a which are also immediately
recognizable for others and are highly relevant for the
decision, s evaluates them according to his evaluation
criteria and integrates these evaluations into an overall
assessment, which in some way takes into account all
consequences of importance – possibly only by deliberately
ignoring them.
R5: No shielding of responsibility by other persons’
responsibility: s’ decision for a was not so pre-structured
by others – by a structuring of 1. the decision situation
or 2. the internal conditions of the decision: evaluations,
factual assumptions, assumptions about alternatives – that
it was subjectively imperative for s. 1. So there was no
real coercion, compelling incitement, action ex ufficio, no
order or the like (Duff, 1990, 83) and 2. neither was there
any brainwashing, targeted misinformation, nor (futuristic)
neurological change of the foundations of the valuation or
similar factors.
R6. Reasonableness: Not to do a (or a substantially similar
act a∗) would have been reasonable for subject s.
The conditions for the responsibility for consequences of
action should actually also take into account the possibility
of producing consequences jointly. The conditions for
responsibility for omissions and for events which could have
been prevented by omitted actions are also missing here. With
regard to the problem of consciousness, however, these cases do
not differ from what is presented here. Since conditions R1, R3.1,
and R6 are irrelevant for the discussion of the significance of
unconscious influences on our actions for responsibility they will
not be discussed any further.
On R2, alternate possibilities: If someone has the intention
to carry out a certain action but unconscious factors intervene
on the way from this intention to the desired goal – during
the formation of the implementation intention or during the
execution itself – so that the actually desired action is not
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executed, does this mean that the subject could not carry out
the actually intended action? The term ‘s can do B’ used in
the condition of alternate possibilities in a first attempt may be
interpreted conditionally, following G.E. Moore (1912, ch. 6): ‘If
s intends/decides to do B, then s does B.’ According to this simple
interpretation, however, the fact that the unconscious distortions
prevented the execution of the originally intended action would
already be the proof that the subject could not perform this
action – so that the subject might no longer be responsible for
his action and its consequences. But this simple interpretation
relieves the subject of responsibility too quickly. If the agent
foresees or suspects the influence of unconscious distortions,
then he could use self-control mechanisms to achieve the desired
result nevertheless. One such strategy to eliminate unwanted
unconscious influences is to proceed strictly analytically in the
decision, in case of major and important decisions also by writing,
i.e., to note down the individual steps (alternatives, consequences,
impact assessment) and in particular to calculate the overall
values. Condition R2 then provides that, in order to correctly say
that the subject could not perform this action, he would also have
failed during execution if he had used such control mechanisms
[analogous considerations for akrasia: Kennett (2001), 155].
On R3, mens rea: The above formulations of mens rea still
leave open whether the knowledge or the intention can also
be unconscious. Is unconscious belief or intention sufficient
for knowingness or intentionality? The sense of mens rea in
the overall concept of responsibility and punishment is: Only
if the agent believes that he brings about the (incriminated)
consequence e can he be socially discouraged from bringing
it about, (i) namely by his recognizing the moral or social
significance, i.e., the moral value, of e and, because of its
negativity, abandoning the action or (ii) by at least recognizing
that this action or the bringing about of this consequence is
punishable, so that bringing it about will probably lead to his
punishment (Lumer, 2012, 708–711; 714–718). The threat of
punishment is of no use with people who do not even believe that
they will bring about the incriminated consequence, and their
subsequent punishment cannot have a deterrent effect, because
the threat of punishment can only lead to the prevention of
action if the subject can associate the action – by believing in
this consequence – with the threat of punishment. However,
both ways of preventing subject s from committing the act imply
that he draws further inferences beyond the mere knowledge of
the consequences, that in his deliberation he also spontaneously
recognizes certain consequences of the consequence and takes
them into account in his decision. However, this spontaneous
recognition of certain consequences of the consequence is a
typical task that can only be solved in the global workspace, i.e.,
by consciousness.6
6Michael Moore also sees consciousness of the decision and of the relevant
consequences as necessary conditions for responsibility, because in the case of
unconsciousness the unity of consciousness is not given and there is no access
to relevant desires and beliefs (Moore, 1980, 1620–1621; Moore, 1984, 339–342;
Moore, 1993/2010, 258). This is correct, but remains somewhat dark in detail. –
Levy, instead, in his important study justifies the need of consciousness for
responsibility, as it is done here, with the need for access to the global workspace.
But for him this access is necessary in order for the action to be connected to
On R4: Sanity, soundness of mind: The conditions for sanity
and insanity are generally formulated only very vaguely in the
criminal law literature7 or very concretely via the existence
of certain conditions such as strong affect, severe alcohol
intoxication, delusions, mental illness. Hence, they do not
specify the general nature of the limitation of the ability to
deliberate. The above conditions, instead, are intended to be
general, but nevertheless reasonably precise and address the
functions of deliberation. What is particularly interesting in the
context of the discussion of the significance of unconsciousness
for responsibility, – after excluding responsibility for merely
unconsciously aspired or believed consequences (R3) – is
mainly: If unconscious assumptions of consequences, which
per se are not morally or legally relevant, massively influence
the agent in his conscious decision and mislead him, so that
the conscious integration of decision-relevant information is
wrong, does this reduce his soundness of mind? An agent,
e.g., unconsciously believes that if he does the (forbidden)
action A, namely stealing and drinking an extremely expensive
wine, he will be cured of a bad disease; then he decides to
do A for conscious but insignificant, rather weak reasons, say,
to want to try how such a wine tastes, although he knows
that doing A is forbidden. In such examples, the agent is not
obviously pathological. But he does not include in his conscious
deliberation reasons for action which are actually decisive and
arrives at, if one takes into account the unconscious reasons,
a comprehensible but, if one only considers the conscious
reasons, completely wrong integration of these reasons, an
irrational decision. In the case of wine theft, these distortions
are so great that not even awareness of the forbiddance of
his actions and the known threat of punishments prevent the
perpetrator from his action. Soundness of mind is intended
to guarantee that the agent has at least a minimum of
practical rationality in order to be able to react adequately
to the moral significance of the situation and the options.
In the example, this level is undercut. Serious unconscious
distortions often lead the agent to look at the decision again,
consciously and critically, and then revise it. The lack of such an
the person, to be consistent and coordinated with other attitudes; the attitudes
behind the action belong to the true self only if they are part of a coherent
perspective from which the options can be evaluated (Levy, 2014a; Levy, 2014b,
87–108). However, this justification sets the conditions for responsibility too high;
they are conditions for an autonomous and authentic decision, but not just for
responsibility. The conditions for freedom of decision are stronger than those for
retrospective responsibility. The latter are part of the system of social control of
action and are mainly to guarantee the subject’s effective and efficient control of her
action (Lumer, 2012, 708–713); however, this controllability is not only given with
a rather ideal freedom of decision. Accordingly, also a judge will not be impressed
by the inner “strife” of a person as the background of some deed, e.g., between the
life of a family father and that of an artist – I am not talking about clinical cases of
schizophrenia – when it comes to punishing a serious crime.
7For example: “At the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong” (M’Naghten rule). “Who, when committing
the act, is unable to recognize the wrong of the act or to act according to this insight
because of a pathological mental disorder, because of a profound disturbance of
consciousness or because of imbecility or a severe other mental anomaly, acts
without guilt” (German penal code: Strafgesetzbuch §20).
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“awakening” is an indication of the subject’s currently insufficient
rational sovereignty.
R5: No shielding: If condition R5 is not fulfilled, i.e., if someone
else has structured the decision situation in such a way that the
decision is pre-programmed, then the other person is responsible
and no longer the subject. Such shielding may exist especially in
the case of targeted priming.
5. CONSCIOUS DECISIONS
INFLUENCED BY UNCONSCIOUS
PRIMING
Now I will analyze various modes of unconscious influences on
our decisions and actions and discuss their critical relevance
with respect to the four challenges. I distinguish three main
groups of such influences according to the stage when
this influence applies. Then several types of influences have
to be distinguished within these groups. The groups and
mechanisms are:
1. A conscious decision is influenced by an unconscious
mechanism:
1.1. unconscious priming (this section);
1.2. dynamically unconscious motives (section 6);
1.3. dorsal pathway information (section 7);
2. the execution of a conscious decision is altered by an
unconscious mechanism (section 8):
2.1. unconscious priming;
2.2. resistances;
3. the decision itself is unconscious (section 9):
3.1. plain unconsciously deliberated action;
3.2. unconscious decision with dynamically unconscious
motives;
3.3. sleepwalking.
So, let’s start with the first group: A conscious decision is
influenced by unconscious priming. Here “unconscious priming”
means that the influence of the prime is not noticed by the
agent; the prime itself can be unconscious, e.g., subliminal,
i.e., presented so briefly (and often later covered) or parafoveal
(immediately outside of the central area of our vision) that it
cannot be consciously detected; but it can also be conscious.
A standard example is priming for high achievement by
achievement-relevant words. The subjects in the first part of the
experiment have to resolve a word-search puzzle, viz. to find in
a 10 × 10 matrix of letters 13 words, which were listed under
the matrix. In the achievement priming, the list of the 13 words
to be searched for included: “win,” “compete,” “succeed,” “strive,”
“attain,” “achieve,” “master.” This is the priming part. In the
second part of the experiment the subjects again had to resolve a
word-search puzzle, namely they had 10 min each time to find as
many as possible of ten hidden words, from an indicated semantic
field – foods, bugs and colors – in three 10 × 10 letter matrices.
None of the subjects suspected any influence of the first part
of the experiment on the second. Nonetheless on the average,
subjects primed with the achievement words found 26 words, the
control group only 21.5 words [Bargh et al., 2001, experiment 1
(1016–1017)].
At least these were Bargh’s results. Since the 1980s Bargh is
the most prominent researcher on unconscious priming effects
on conscious decisions and on the execution of actions. More
recently, however, his studies have been in the center of the
replication crisis in social psychology: Other researchers have
tried to replicate many of Bargh’s experiments and very often
did not succeed; among the experiments whose replication
failed were also some of the most spectacular like “achievement
priming” (Bargh et al., 2001, experiments 1 and 3; failed
replication, e.g., Harris et al., 2013) and the “Florida effect” (Bargh
et al., 1996, experiment 2; failed replication: Doyen et al., 2012;
general overview of replication problems of Bargh’s experiments:
Bartlett, 2013). Other researchers suspect that the causes of the
failed replications are statistical problems – small samples, weak
effects, low significance threshold – and confirmation bias –
the experimenters were able to manipulate the results in the
direction of the hypothesis. – Within the discussion of the present
article, a first possible strategy for dealing with this unclear
empirical situation would be to say: The whole phenomenon of
priming is not proven at all; presumably it is an artifact; then
it cannot be a challenge for the conceptions of action, freedom
and responsibility defended here. So, one would not need to
discuss the phenomenon further here. If, however, later it were
to become clear that several of the effects are real, i.e., that
unconscious priming of decisions and action executions exists,
then the theories discussed here would have an open flank.
Therefore, I will pursue a different, more cautious strategy in
the following: A great many priming effects have been found; it
cannot be ruled out that they are all artifacts, but this is unlikely.
Which of them are artifacts cannot be established at this point.
But I expect (or at least do not exclude) that there are some
priming effects that work qualitatively like the ones reported,
even though some or many examples from the literature may be
artifacts. So, according to this strategy, the nature of the priming
effects is taken seriously – but not necessarily the individual
example –; and the mechanisms behind them are accepted as
challenges requiring discussion and comment from an action-
theoretical and ethical point of view. This discussion follows
immediately. The topic of this discussion is then, for example,
Bargh’s theory on the mechanisms behind the priming effects,
not the individual example. And the aim is to show that these
mechanisms are much more conscious than Bargh assumes and
thus mostly leave room for agency, responsibility and freedom. If,
contrary to expectation, it should turn out one day that all types
of priming effects are artifacts, this would not be detrimental to
the theories defended here, because then the empirical basis of
the challenges for these theories would not exist in the first place.
Let us apply the second strategy to the experiment on
achievement priming! I do not find the authors’ explanation
of this effect very plausible;8 therefore, I present you my own
8Bargh and his co-authors explain this result by an unconscious activation of an
achievement goal, which then again unconsciously led to a better performance
[“auto-motive hypothesis” (Bargh et al., 2001, 1014–1016; 1024; see also: Chartrand
and Bargh, 1996, 465)]. I find this little plausible. First, achievement goals are rather
specific; but when the subjects are working on the first task they do not know
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attempts at an explanation: i. The achievement priming induces
an atmosphere of achievement, which includes feeling powerful
and a desire to act correspondingly with much energy and
high performance. This achievement atmosphere brings about
that only very effective search strategies pop up in the subject’s
conscious mind when he thinks about how to approach the
search task; and he may simply choose the only or first of these
as suitable for finding many words. This explanation does not
presuppose that the subject strives for achievement in a narrow
sense, i.e., wants to be the best and to follow the most effective
strategy; but the achievement atmosphere lets effective search
strategies come to mind first, as if the subject had the achievement
goal and had sought for effective search strategies. ii. In a variant
of this explanation the priming induces only the achievement
desire, which is sufficient to reduce the range of options that
spring to mind to highly effective ones. iii. Finally, in a situation
where some effort is required, the still existent activation of the
achievement words may directly induce the occurrence of a desire
for high performance and the respective conscious goal setting,
which in turn leads to a search for very effective strategies.
This was only one example of conscious decisions influenced
by unconscious priming with conscious primes; there are many
others (e.g., Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003, studies 1 and 4a;
Bargh et al., 2001, experiments 3, 4, and 5; Bargh et al., 1996;
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1998, 868–873). Similar
effects have also been obtained by subliminal priming (e.g.,
Custers and Aarts, 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2007; more examples:
Custers and Aarts, 2010, 49–50). Apart from the already
mentioned ways in which priming works (i.e., inducing a certain
emotional and evaluative atmosphere, inducing the activation of
a general desire, inducing the formation of conscious goal), I
also propose the following pathways: iv. Priming of an option
salience: Priming can directly induce that certain options of
a later opened option set are neuronally activated or become
salient for the subject. This implies that the subject can choose
this option for different reasons, though for the observer, at
least at the statistical level, it seems to be a decision for
the very specific contentual reason connected to the priming
content. Hence, there may be an extensional decision for high
achievement, but no intensional decision with this content.
v. Priming of a framing: Priming may induce the subject to
feel situated in a certain environment, or to feel a certain
kind of reality, e.g., a hostile or cooperative environment, as
normal; and this leads to some shifting of the subject’s behavioral
or evaluative standards. vi. Priming of a role: Similarly, the
subject may be primed to feel to be in a certain role. vii.
Priming of a specific aspect of a choice: Priming may also induce
that certain aspects of the options are intrusive and hence
more often and more strongly considered in the decision. For
many examples of the literature several of these explanations
are possible.
anything about the second task and about what higher achievement in it could
consist in. Therefore, the achievement priming may have activated an achievement
desire but not yet an achievement goal. Second, high achievement in the second
task requires unwaveringly following a systematic strategy. This probably is not
possible without consciously following this strategy, which in turn presupposes
some conscious decision to apply this strategy.
More generally unconscious priming of conscious decisions
seems to function as follows. During deliberation we have to
search for possible options and their possible consequences. This
is an association or inspiration task. For such tasks it is not
surprising and quite normal that present neuronal activations,
including subliminally caused activations, induce semantically
connected ideas to pop up and, through their intrusiveness, to
have more weight in the decision. The latter possibility is opened
primarily by the fact that a comparative desirability quantification
of the options’ relevant aspects often is not possible or is
relatively difficult and costly and, therefore, not undertaken so
that the pondering of these desirabilities is done in an estimating
holistic value judgment, where present activations may have
their corresponding influences. The priming effects will work
unnoticed by the subject especially if the relevant options are
roughly or even exactly of equal value for him so that a shift of
desirability and a distortion of the decision are not critical; most
experiments in the priming literature work with such choices
(where the alternatives for the subjects are rationally of roughly
equal value) (Di Nucci, 2014, 41–42); hence it is not surprising
that priming can easily influence a decision. Primed irrational
desirability shifts in favor of clearly worse options probably would
be noticed and then consciously corrected accordingly.
What does this analysis of the functioning of unconsciously
primed conscious decisions imply for the four challenges? C1.
Optimality judgment theory of deliberation and intention: All
described mechanisms lie within the scope of the optimality
belief theory. The optimality judgment making up the decision
rests on the consideration of advantages and disadvantages of
the option; that this judgment is not really made inferentially
but only in an estimating holistic way is not excluded by
that theory. C2. Agency and intentionality: The resulting
actions are also actions in an emphatic sense. In contrast
to what many researchers on priming at least insinuate,
the decision in these cases is taken consciously and the
intention is executed normally. Furthermore, the decision
reflects the subject’s conscious desires – though their weights
sometimes may be somewhat distorted, however, in the usual
range of desirability judgments without precise criteria. C3.
Responsibility: With respect to responsibility it is important
that the decision process be conscious and hence under critical
supervision. Strong distortions with respect to the subject’s
values and standards of rationality would probably be noticed
and corrected. And if instead of fostering options within the
subject’s usual range, the priming brings strange or disliked
options – e.g., criminal acts – to mind, these options are
still consciously evaluated. If the holistically made optimality
judgment is distorted by priming, these distortions in the
examples, however, are comparatively small, within the normal
range and far from violating the quite broad condition of
soundness of mind (R4). Therefore, in these cases there is
no infringement of the subjects’ responsibility. C4. Freedom:
Priming does not impute extraneous desires to the subject,
censored desires are not helped to break through, existing own
desires are not hindered, and options are taken from the normal
repertoire (though with a bias for certain options) and then
subjected to conscious valuation, etc. Therefore, autonomy is
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not restricted. And as long as the distortions of the holistic
judgment of optimality remain within the scope of the usual,
the rationality of the decision is not called into question by the
unconscious influences.
6. DYNAMICALLY UNCONSCIOUS
MOTIVES INFLUENCING CONSCIOUS
DECISIONS
The second group of unconscious influences on conscious
decisions consists of dynamically unconscious motives as studied
by Freud: The respective motives play a role in the decision,
but because of resistances against their delicate contents they are
suppressed from access to consciousness and are accessible to the
agent’s consciousness only after a psychoanalytic revelation.
An example in kind described by Freud is: When restructuring
his consulting room, a neurologist finds a simple old wooden
stethoscope, which he does not need any longer. After thinking
for a while where to place it he puts it laterally on his desk so
that it sits exactly between his own and the patient’s chair. At
the beginning of the psychoanalysis of this event the neurologist
says he could have put the stethoscope in other places. A long
analysis of the neurologist’s career aspirations, however, reveals
that on the one hand the stethoscope represents the successful
satisfaction of his sexual desires by the vicinity to his objects of
love during auscultation and on the other the separation from
his patients: The stethoscope stands between him and his patients
like Sigurd’s sword between Sigurd and Brunhilde (Freud, 1901–
1924/1941, 216–219). The later revelation of the unconscious
motives’ influence on the decision and the description of
their contents completely relies on the subject’s ideas. The
decision itself is conscious. And the preceding deliberation
will have included many other conscious considerations (not
reported by Freud) like the stethoscope’s decorative and symbolic
value. The characteristic feature of this case (apart from the
fact that the effective intention is conscious), however, is the
mixture of conscious and unconscious motives; the unconscious
motives are present only in the form of intuitive inclinations,
without conscious justification and without revealing their real
content. From Freud’s description it is not clear how much the
unconscious desires influenced the decision at all. The resulting
action looks rational even without these unconscious motives,
but, as the neurologist himself says, it lies in a spectrum of
(almost) equivalent alternatives, so that the unconscious motives
may well have been the deciding factor. My proposal about
how the integration of conscious and unconscious motives can
take place in the conscious decision – after all the neurologist
consciously integrates only his conscious considerations into the
conscious decision – is similar to that given for the functioning
of unconscious priming: The agent does not execute a precise
inference from the various (vague) desirability considerations to
the optimality judgment, i.e., a kind of arithmetical calculation;
instead he estimates the total desirabilities of the options, with an
eye on all the aspects taken into consideration, in holistic value
judgments, whereby the decisive steps are made unconsciously.
And this gives room for the unconscious motives and for their
influence going unnoticed by the agent. The difference with
respect to what happens in priming is that dynamic unconscious
motives are really desires, which might change the option’s total
desirability. As pertinent desires, during the deliberation they
should have been consciously considered and exposed to critical
scrutiny and rational assessment on a par with the desires for the
other consequences of the object: are they legitimate or perhaps
irrational (e.g., because they are unfulfillable), what is the total
desirability of their fulfillment? The results of this scrutiny and
assessment should then be integrated into the total evaluation
of the options. Instead, because of their delicate content, these
desires are suppressed in the consciousness and are integrated
unfiltered into the overall evaluation.
A fictitious example [based on (Levy, 2014b, v)] may illustrate
the more extreme and critical possibilities of this mechanism.
The president of a search committee rejects a candidate for a
job, because he unconsciously reminds her of her ex-husband;
the only other candidate is clearly less qualified; and having
much authority, her vote is decisive. If one disregards possible
irrational desires (such as punishing the ex), the unconscious
desire could be not to want to have people with these traits
around or in important positions. The conscious deliberation
and public justification is done in such a way that the president
exaggerates the rejected candidate’s minor defects, belittles his
achievements, whitewashes defects of the worse candidate and
overstates his achievements. But this is only a retrospective
rationalization, while the main mechanism is again that already
before, in a holistic judgment, the representative of the ex-
husband is devalued as unacceptable. The subsequent vote is
intentional and probably also rational: the president has voted in
favor of what she considers to be the better, but is, in fact, clearly
the worse candidate. This is ignorant wrongdoing. The critical
point, however, is the preparatory action for forming judgments
about the candidates. The judgments’ aim was to determine the
objectively best candidate. This goal was missed because of the
unconscious influences. So could the president not carry out the
action of finding the best candidate? She could have done the
evaluation analytically, and then the distortions would probably
have been noticed; hence, she could make a correct evaluation,
the alternate possibility condition (R2) was fulfilled. With such
important decisions as in the example, it is also a duty of care
to take measures to exclude distortion, even if there is only a
suspicion that one’s own assessment could be distorted. Because
the president has not complied with this duty of care before, her
later voting action is a culpably ignorant wrongdoing (R3.5).
How is the influence of dynamic unconscious motives to
be assessed from the practical philosophical viewpoints? C1.
Optimality judgment theory of deliberation and intention: What
goes on in these cases is covered by the optimality belief theory of
intentions in a similar way as unconscious priming of conscious
deliberations. However, there is a characteristic mixture of
conscious and unconscious aspects and valuations which are
integrated in the conscious optimality judgment. C2. Agency and
intentionality: The resulting behavior is an action in the broad
sense caused by a respective intention. However, the emphatic
agential character is more or less reduced: The decision is inter
alia also determined by desires that are not part of the conscious
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ego. The unconscious desires (in Freud’s example: to be close to
one’s patients but at the same time to be kept away from real
intimacy by a symbolic boundary) also only result in unconscious
intentionality. This prevents the action from being an action
in the emphatic sense. The president, instead, achieves her
unconscious goal of not wanting her ex-husband’s representative
to be around her, etc., but misses her conscious goal of identifying
and hiring the best candidate. Therefore, which aspects of the
action are intentional must be determined in each individual
case. C3. Responsibility: Responsibility must also be judged on
a case-by-case basis when conscious decisions are influenced by
dynamically unconscious motives. Responsibility also depends
on moral or legal duties of care and on the possibility of
acting otherwise. So Freud’s neurologist is responsible for his
conscious action and the achievement of his conscious goal,
but he is not responsible for the realization of the unconscious
intention, because it was not conscious and no corresponding
duty of care existed. The president, instead, is also responsible
for the realization of her unconscious intention, because she
has violated a compliable duty of care. With strong neuroses
it may be impossible to act differently even with the help of
self-control strategies (R2); the conscious consideration may also
be so distorted that the neurotic is insane (R4). C4. Freedom:
In any case, the influence of dynamic unconscious motives on
the decision curtails freedom of decision, because these motives
evade the potential censorship by the conscious ego, so that
the agent no longer controls which of her desires enter into
the decision. Also, the integration of the information into the
optimality judgment (D5) is always distorted, thus impairing
rationality. But these curtailments vary in degree according to the
case; with the president, they are so severe that they even impede
reaching the conscious goal.
7. CONSCIOUS DECISIONS
INFLUENCED BY DORSAL PATHWAY
INFORMATION
Information from the actually automatic processing of
perceptions via the dorsal pathway can also unconsciously
influence conscious decisions. One example is: The experimenter
pours sugar into two bottles on which the subjects had to affix,
according to their own choice, the labels 1 “not sodium cyanide,
not poison” with a red skull and crossbones preceded by the
word “not,” and 2 “sucrose, table sugar.” The experimenter then
placed one cup of beverage in front of each of the two bottles
and added one spoonful of sugar from the corresponding bottles
to the cups. The subjects then had to choose from which cup
they wanted to drink. They were relatively reluctant to drink
from the cup marked “not sodium cyanide, not poison” (Rozin
et al., 1990). Substantially, the two alternatives are completely
equivalent. Rozin explains the preference with an interference
of dorsal processing of perception information, which actually
serves the automatic action control, in particular fine-tuning,
into the conscious decision. Dorsal, unconscious processing is
encapsulated and merely semantic, thus ignoring the syntax;
hence “not sodium cyanide,” etc., is perceived as “cyanide,”
etc. This false interpretation then influences the conscious
decision. – According to Rozin’s explanation, the unconscious
information would intervene directly in the formation of the
optimality judgment, thus distorting it. This would correspond
to how the influence of unconscious priming on a conscious
optimality judgment was explained above. But the subjects may
also have a conscious, irrational residual doubt, which they even
recognize as false, but from which they can hardly escape. Then
the unconscious influence is to be located in the formation of the
belief about the possible toxicity; the subsequent decision itself
would even correspond to the criteria of a rational decision: the
integration of desirabilities and probabilities into the optimality
judgment would be completely correct. In any case, the influence
of unconscious false information is relatively small; it only comes
into play relatively strongly because the two alternatives are
actually completely equivalent.
C1–C3: Not only is the last piece of the pathway along which
unconscious dorsal information influences conscious decisions
just the same as in unconscious priming (section 5), our
normative evaluation is also almost the same. C4: However, there
is one difference: the rationality of the subjects who preferred
not to drink from the cup labeled “no cyanide” is curtailed,
insofar as they can certainly recognize that their reservations are
completely unfounded but apparently cannot detach themselves
from them. However, because of the actual equivalence of the
options, this is no real loss; and we may again surmise that
significant distortions would have been noticed by the subjects
and consciously corrected by them.
8. UNCONSCIOUSLY ALTERED
EXECUTION OF CONSCIOUS
INTENTIONS
After a conscious (proximal) intention has been formed actions
usually are executed by the execution system, for the most part
unconsciously. This is the normal way. However, there can also
be unconscious factors influencing this execution in specific,
contentual ways. I have found two mechanisms via which this can
happen, again priming and psychic resistance.
A famous example of unconscious priming of the execution
mode is an experiment by Bargh et al. (1996) revealing the
Florida effect: Priming by reading words related to elderliness
(e.g., “Florida” and “Bingo”) caused subjects to walk (a little,
e.g., speed −11%) slower when they exited the laboratory,
compared to subjects who read words that were not related
to the elderly (Bargh et al., 1996). In this experiment the
priming does not alter the intention – probably there is only
the intention to walk to the next station in the course of
experiments but no intention to walk slowly or like an elderly
person –; the priming alters only the intention’s execution.
For many actions the intention is somewhat vague and
leaves much leeway to the execution system to fill in the
details like speed, trajectory of movements, temporal order
of systematically independent steps. In the present example,
priming on the stereotype of the elderly may have led to an
alteration of the subjects’ psychic atmosphere, which in turn, via
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a sort of automatic acting out, correspondingly influenced the
execution mode.
Another cause of unconscious but characteristic alterations
of an action’s execution mode can be inner conflicts. The agent
has decided to execute a particular action, however, against
(open but sometimes also unconscious) misgivings and personal
resistances. This conflict may then alter the execution mode in
favor of the personal objections. In particular the resistance may
weaken the effort invested in the action, which may be sufficient
to make the action inefficient or even ineffective. An example may
be that when subjects throw darts at pictures of persons whom
they like they achieve a much worse score as when throwing at
pictures of neutral persons (Rozin et al., 1986, 705–708; discussed
by: Gendler, 2008, 636). Throwing darts at pictures of liked
persons is probably seen as a violation of these persons and
infidelity with respect to them; imagine what the agent would feel
when the respective person entered the room and saw the scene!
(Different explanation: Gendler, 2008).
How should unconscious influences on the execution mode
be assessed from the practical philosophical standpoints? C1.
Optimality judgment theory of deliberation and intention: Again
the just given explanations are compatible with the optimality
belief theory and intentional causalism since these theories
require neither that an action be determined in all details by the
respective intention – which by the way would be impossible –,
nor that the execution mechanism work perfectly. C2. Agency
and intentionality: In the priming example, the resulting action
is clearly covered by the (presumable) intention because this
intention leaves sufficient margin for the walking speed: The
real speed changes are rather small and can be revealed only
by exact measurement and statistics. Hence the subjects walk
intentionally. The primed walking speed instead is not intended
and, according to the simple view about intentionality (Adams,
1986), is a fortiori not intentional. Analogously, throwing the
dart is intentional, hitting the target is intentional, missing it
is unintentional since the intention was to hit the target. The
resistance, which (let us suppose at least in some cases) is the
cause of the misthrow, does not make up an intention, hence
cannot render it intentional. Even much more spectacular failures
mean that the execution is defective but they do not exclude
that the resulting behavior is an action. C3. Responsibility: The
subjects’ direct responsibility in these examples goes as far as
their intentionality goes (R3). So the person who does not hit the
picture of the liked person is not directly responsible for this. Is
he indirectly responsible? Consider this example: A sniper is to
eliminate a terrorist with an unexpected shot. The sniper so far
has only fired at cardboard targets, but never at living people;
he is scrupled and misses his target – contrary to his excellent
training results –; the mission fails. In this case the sniper might
be indirectly responsible for the failure, namely if he knew about
his success-damaging scruples and could have taken alternative
measures (e.g., deployment of another sniper, use of target-
finding projectiles...). C4. Freedom: Freedom of decision is not
infringed per se by the mechanisms working in these examples,
because these mechanisms only operate after the decision has
been made. In drastic cases, however, freedom of action could be
restricted to the extent that the ability to achieve one’s goals is
hampered. Nonetheless, the scruples in the darts example could
be an indicator that the decision was not authentic. However,
this lack of authenticity would be accidental, because the agent
may have consciously reflected his doubts in the decision and
nevertheless rationally and authentically decided to throw.
9. UNCONSCIOUS DELIBERATIONS AND
DECISIONS
The last group of unconsciously influenced actions to be
discussed here are unconscious actions based on unconscious
decisions – where these unconscious decisions, the preceding
deliberations and the resulting intentions are mental states,
which are unconscious in the sense of being preconscious (and
hence often consciously retrievable) or only reconstructable
from known clues (by the subject but sometimes only under
professional guidance or only by experts) or accessible by
psychoanalytic means. Generally for this group it holds that
unconscious deliberation is possible and fairly differentiated, e.g.,
flexibly adapted to the present situation and includes pointedly
and creatively searching for fitting actions. In many respects such
completely unconscious deliberations function like conscious
ones: possible actions are considered and evaluated according to
their consequences and the one with the highest evaluation is
executed. But compared to conscious deliberation, unconscious
deliberation is primitive. It does not ponder advantages and
disadvantages but is simplistically goal-oriented in that finding
an effective means may be sufficient for choosing it. So only one
positive option and inaction are compared and only one (desired)
consequence is taken into account. Moreover, unconsciously
deliberated actions are mostly of relatively small size only,
partly because only to a limited degree does unconsciousness
permit coordination of several small actions. The primitiveness
of completely unconscious deliberations is, of course, due to
the limited abilities of the unconscious; in particular, due to
modularization and the lack of access to the universal workplace,
it cannot consider much more alternatives and consequences
than just described. In a certain sense, actions caused by
completely unconscious deliberations are easier to explain
than many previous examples with only some unconscious
components, because no contentual influence of unconscious
factors on a conscious decision has to be explained. – Apart from
these general features, actions based on unconscious decision
are a relatively big and heterogeneous group so that several
subgroups have to be analyzed separately.
1. Plain unconsciously deliberated action: The most basic form of
actions based on unconscious decisions are plain unconsciously
deliberated actions: Elementary deliberations on a sophistication
level of Aristotelian practical inferences (“I have aim e. My
doing a is a (sufficient) means to e. Therefore, I do a.”) are
simple enough to be processed unconsciously, however, with
the risk of overlooking consciously recognizable problems of the
chosen option. There is no dynamic reason for the unconscious
processing but only an economic reason, viz. to save the
scarce resource of conscious attention. Examples of this kind
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are: While standing during a conversation the agent supports
herself skillfully on the backrest of a chair just standing there;
while doing this the agent may be fully concentrated on the
conversation. Or a teacher, while being absorbed by his lecture
and walking back and forth, may unconsciously open a window.
Such actions, while being unconsciously initiated and of modest
complexity, probably are not yet automatic routine actions
triggered by the perception of a certain stimulus because the
situation is too singular for being the trigger of an already learned
fitting routine. The advantage of such actions is their efficiency
in not using the scarce resources of consciousness; their general
disadvantage, however, is the increased risk of overlooking
better alternatives and, still more important, significant negative
consequences because the action proposal is not exposed to the
critical examination of consciousness.
2. Unconscious decisions with dynamically unconscious motives:
In another subform the unconscious deliberation includes
dynamically unconscious motives. The fact that these motives
are delicate and, therefore, have been consciously criticized in
some way, then suppressed and may again be criticized if getting
conscious is the reason why they can express themselves and
have successful actional consequences only in unconsciously
deliberated actions. Although Freud analyzes many expressions
of unconscious influences, in particular Freudian slips and
neurotic symptoms, most of them are not really intentional; they
do not result from unconscious deliberation and decision but
are mainly failures of automatisms due to (sometimes motivated)
lack of attention.9 However, some of them seem to be intentional
actions. A famous example was reported by Freud about himself.
When trying to provide a chair for an old person, a young
and attractive girl with the same intention arrives at the chair
a moment before Freud and takes it. Freud, still having the
unaccomplished intention to provide the chair, embraces the
girl from behind to take the chair as well, thereby touching the
girl’s lap for a moment. He immediately releases the embrace
and dissolves the absurd and delicate situation, which nobody
seems to have recognized as abnormal. A self-analysis reveals
Freud’s unconscious erotic motive to touch the attractive girl
at an intimate part of her body (Freud, 1901–1924/1941, 194).
This may be analyzed as follows: The overall action, to fetch a
chair for the old person, has been consciously deliberated and
decided. However, when the events do not occur as planned and
a decision how to continue after the rush to the chair has to be
taken, Freud unconsciously acknowledges the chance to erotically
touch the girl, values it positively and realizes it. Evidence that
all this happened unconsciously is that only after the beginning
of the erotic action does Freud consciously acknowledge the
delicate and prohibited character of his doing and then stops it
immediately and consciously.
3. Sleepwalking: Typical sleepwalking consists of the sleepwalker
getting up from bed, walking through the house open-eyed
but with a rigid gaze, e.g., to the toilet, then returning to
bed and continuing to sleep. If he is spoken to, he answers
briefly but usually incomprehensibly. The sleepwalker is not
9Analyses of action slips as failures of automatisms: Reason and Mycielska (1982).
aware of this and cannot remember this episode after waking.
Single photon emission computed tomography of a sleepwalking
patient showed deactivation of large areas of frontal and parietal
association cortices during the episode, together with activation
in the anterior cingulate cortex and thalamus. So the patient was
motor-excited, but mentally calm, unconscious (Levy, 2014b, 73–
74, referring to Bassetti et al., 2000). In rare cases sleepwalkers are
capable of very complex actions – longer car journeys, writing
short but mutilated e-mails, even homicides (Levy, 2014b, 71–73;
77). Despite their complexity, the largest parts of these actions
are automatic and stimulus-induced. But primitive decisions are
made and new action sequences are initiated, as they correspond
to the abilities of a mind cut off from further considerations
of consequences.
After having analyzed the functioning of several types of
unconscious actions based on unconscious decisions let us turn to
our practical philosophical questions about them. C1. Optimality
judgment theory of deliberation and intention: All of these actions
conform to the optimality belief theory. The deliberations are
unconscious and very simple but still function in the way
of searching for advantages and disadvantages of options and
aggregating them to optimality judgments – even if only two
options with one advantage or disadvantage are considered.
And the optimality judgments then function as intentions which
cause the corresponding behavior. C2. Agency: Consequently, if
the unconsciously deliberated optimality judgment causes the
corresponding behavior in a non-deviant way then, according to
intentional causalism, this behavior is an action in the broad sense
and unconsciously intentional. However, it is not an action in the
emphatic sense because it is not controlled by the conscious ego
and because other values of the subject (than the one strived for
via the action’s aim) that could be relevant for the evaluation of
the alternatives are not considered in the deliberation (Lumer,
2013). This verdict may seem debatable for plain unconsciously
deliberated actions because the action mostly corresponds to
what the conscious ego could have decided as well. However,
this desirable result does not change the underlying structure
with its lack of conscious control, which sometimes leads to
highly problematic results. Unconscious actions with dynamically
unconscious motives are still less actions in the emphatic sense
since these motives are even rejected by the conscious ego, and
the subject would have dismissed the executed option if she
had decided consciously. C3. Responsibility: Because of their
complete unconsciousness, unconsciously deliberated actions
fulfill neither the mens rea condition (R3) for responsibility
nor that of the soundness of mind (R4). However, plain
unconsciously deliberated actions and those with dynamically
unconscious motives – unlike sleepwalking – usually take
place alongside conscious activities and are monitored to some
extent. That is why we often discover that they are taking a
negative course and can then consciously interrupt them – as
Freud did in the autobiographical example. This leads to a
certain indirect responsibility for these actions. C4. Freedom of
decision: Decisions based on unconscious deliberation are neither
autonomous nor authentic nor rational, above all because there
is insufficient access to the available information on relevant
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consequences and to the pertinent evaluation bases, and the
ability to integrate greater amounts of information is also lacking.
10. CONCLUSION
Let me recap the results of the preceding discussion.
C1. Optimality judgment theory of deliberation and intention:
All the considered unconsciously influenced actions are
covered by the optimality belief theory; hence this theory has
been confirmed.
C2. Agency: Furthermore, according to intentional causalism,
all the discussed mechanisms represent actions at least in the
broad sense. The actions and the goal attainment are intentional,
though, in the cases of deliberation with dynamically unconscious
motives and entirely unconscious deliberation, only unconsciously
intentional; and with unconsciously altered execution modes, the
intentionality of the action under certain relevant descriptions
may be restricted. Not all of these actions are actions in
the emphatic sense (i.e., actions whose deliberation, using the
aggregation mode and the critical potential of the conscious ego –
and hopefully also respecting standards of rationality –, virtually
consider and integrate all of the subject’s values): Unconsciously
deliberated actions are not actions in the emphatic sense, and
particularly so, to an always problematic degree if they are
driven by consciously rejected desires; if conscious decisions are
influenced by dynamic unconscious motives, emphatic agency is
somewhat curtailed. Intentional causalism as a theory about what
actions are has mastered the challenge from unconsciousness
well: It captures and classifies differentiatedly all analyzed
behaviors which should (not) be classified as actions.
C3. Responsibility: We are directly responsible for consciously
deliberated actions in which the decision is influenced by
unconscious priming or dorsal information. In the case of
unconsciously altered execution, direct responsibility extends
as far as intentionality, and in most cases quite far. The
situation is most complex with actions based on conscious
deliberation influenced by dynamically unconscious motives; they
must be considered in detail in each case: In serious cases (e.g.,
psychopathologies) the conscious integration of information is
so distorted that even soundness of mind, hence responsibility
(at the moment) is missing (R4). Apart from that, we are
directly responsible for these actions and their consequences as
far as the conscious intentionality goes; however, we are not
directly responsible for the merely unconsciously intended action
characteristics and consequences. Finally, we are never directly
responsible for unconsciously deliberated and decided actions.
In case of lacking direct responsibility there still may be an
indirect responsibility for not having taken measures to prevent
the loss of direct responsibility; i.e., knowing about all these
mechanisms, it could be wise to use stronger measures of self-
control or to intervene against excessive influences of dynamically
unconscious motives; and such measures could also be morally
required. We also have some secondary responsibility for actions
based on plain unconscious decisions, insofar as we can interrupt
them as soon as we realize that they are going in a wrong
direction. In such cases some of the analyzed restrictions of direct
responsibility would be compensated by an extension of our
indirect responsibility.
C4. Freedom of decision: Influences on conscious deliberations
due to unconscious priming hardly affect freedom of decision
(at least in the cases considered here). If the execution of the
action is influenced by unconscious factors, this does not curtail
freedom of decision, because this influence only occurs after
deciding, but does in part curtail freedom of action. Rationality
may be curtailed when the conscious decision is influenced by
unconscious, but false, too simple information from the dorsal
pathway. The influence of dynamically unconscious motives on
conscious decisions more or less severely curtails freedom of
decision, because these motives are excluded from being assessed
by the ego, so that they cannot possibly be filtered out critically.
Finally, completely unconscious decisions are generally not free.
Rearranging the just summarized results about responsibility
and freedom, one might differentiate three groups of
mechanisms:
A. Unconscious influences on our actions already known
before 1980: 1.2. (This numbering refers to the list at the
beginning of section 5). Influence of dynamically unconscious
motives on conscious decisions curtails freedom of decision;
and these influences can eliminate responsibility entirely or
reduce it considerably; but because this mechanism is known
and often we can take measures against its influence we
can be indirectly responsible for the respective actions. 3.2.,
3.3. Our unconscious decisions on the basis of dynamically
unconscious motives as well as decisions during sleepwalking
are neither free nor are we responsible for them. This
group (A) of unconsciously influenced actions contains the
severest curtailments of freedom and responsibility; but they
are long known, already considered in jurisdiction, and more
recent analysis says that targeted influences of dynamically
unconscious motives (1.2 and 3.2) are much rarer than
Freud assumed.
B. Unconscious, mostly harmless influences on our actions
detected after 1980: 1.1. Unconscious priming of conscious
decisions or 1.3. influences of (wrong) dorsal pathway
information on conscious decisions have been recognized
only much more recently than mechanisms of group A.
Usually they do not curtail responsibility, priming does
not curtail rationality and freedom of decision, whereas
unconscious influences of dorsal pathway information can
restrain rationality and freedom but only slightly. Altogether
these influences are harmless. Given the widely expressed
worries about curtailments of freedom and responsibility
by “the new unconscious,” this result of our discussion is
most surprising.
C. Unconscious, somewhat more critical influences on our
actions detected after 1980: 2.1., 2.2. The execution of actions
altered by unconscious priming or psychological resistance leaves
the freedom of decision unaffected, but dissolves our direct
responsibility for deviations from our intentions. However,
even in this case indirect responsibility is possible, if one
knows these mechanisms and can work against them. 3.1. Plain
unconscious decisions are neither free, nor are we directly
responsible for their results; but again we can be indirectly
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responsible for them. However, and this is reassuring, such
plain unconscious decisions usually involve only small actions
and they are also somewhat monitored alongside the actions in
focus, so that they can be interrupted immediately in critical
cases. Group C therefore contains the newly discovered, actually
critical unconscious mechanisms. But even they are far less
problematic than many voices of public discussion suggest: For
they concern only small actions or limit only responsibility, but
not freedom of decision; and, with appropriate caution and the
use of compensatory techniques, most of the limitation of direct
responsibility can be compensated by indirect responsibility.
Altogether then, the more recent (since about 1980)
psychological discoveries about unconscious influences on our
actions complement our ideas about the functioning of actions.
However, for practical philosophical and legal concerns they are
much less relevant than originally thought and often stated. They
change very little with respect to the question of the agential
character of and responsibility for our actions as well as freedom
of decision. The most important restrictions in these respects
are still those, known for a long time, of somnambulism and
dynamically unconscious motives, where the latter, however, have
been found to be much less present than Freud thought. This
is good news theoretically, because intentional causalism, the
standard conception of responsibility and the rationality and
the autonomy conception of freedom, i.e., the most important
theories in these fields, have thus withstood criticism. And it
is also good news practically, because the present practices of
attributing responsibility and enhancing freedom of decision do
not have to be abandoned and replaced by completely uncertain
and worrying alternatives.
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